CD/PV.674
10 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 March 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 674th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Republic of Korea, Norway, Argentina, Egypt, Brazil and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Before giving the floor to those inscribed to speak today, I should like on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to extent a cordial welcome to those representatives of the NGO community present today in the public gallery, who, in accordance with what has become a well-established tradition, will present to the Conference a message to commemorate International Women's Day. As you know, International Women's Day was celebrated on 8 March but, nevertheless, I should like to take this first available opportunity to extend our very best wishes to all the women present in the room today and say how much we appreciate their constant commitment to disarmament and peace. I wish now to give the floor to Ms. Jenifer Mackby of the secretariat to read out the message addressed to us on this occasion.

Ms. MACKBY (Secretariat): The message reads as follows:

"On the 8th day of March women all around the world celebrated International Women's Day. In commemorating women's lives, this day serves as a reminder of the strength and resilience women have shown in struggling for peace and justice. The issue of peace has always been of particular importance to women as they have been, and continue to be, adversely affected both by violence manifested overtly and in its structural forms. In this light, as the international women's community continues to prepare for the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, our thoughts are concentrated on the conference's themes - equality, development and peace. We view disarmament as an essential condition for peace.

"Today we wish to convey to the Conference on Disarmament our hopes and our fears. We wish to express our support to you for your efforts in advancing the goal of arms limitation and disarmament. We hope your activities lead us toward a weapon-free world. We also fear that progress is too slow. As the world rapidly changes, opportunities can be both created and missed. We call on the Conference on Disarmament to take advantage of this period in history and rapidly advance its disarmament negotiations.

"Working for peace and disarmament, we have reflected on our preferred vision of the future in this post-cold-war era. We have envisioned not only what we want our world to look like, but also what our responsibilities to it entail. We reject a world order based on violence, force and coercion and instead embrace one where cooperation, community, and the meeting of human needs form the foundation of human interaction. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to undertake its work with this vision in mind.

"Disarmament is necessary to produce system-wide changes in the world's political, social, and economic conditions, and must involve the active participation of all States and their peoples. As non-governmental organizations, we take advantage of the possibility we have to observe the plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament. Today we ask you to consider the possibility of us observing the Ad Hoc Committees as well.

"In addressing you today, we wish to draw attention to several specific issues of importance to us:

"The comprehensive test-ban treaty. We congratulate you on beginning negotiation for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Women have led efforts promoting such negotiations for a very long time.

"We are hopeful that the work of this Committee will lead to a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty permanently prohibiting all nuclear-weapons testing. We call on those Governments currently adhering to a moratorium on testing to prolong the moratorium after July 1994 with other nuclear Powers following suit.

"On the issue of treaty verification and compliance, we call for the implementation of an effective, efficient and non-discriminatory verification regime. The treaty should, in our view, contain a provision on the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, we call on the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to further specify, strengthen, and institutionalize peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms as a means of ensuring treaty compliance. The treaty should be used to communicate a universal commitment to the non-violent settlement of international disputes. We also wish to refer the members of the Conference to the "People's test-ban treaty" which NGOs submitted to you a year or so ago.

"The rationale for a comprehensive test-ban treaty extends beyond peace and disarmament concerns. The radiation produced by nuclear-weapons testing is adversely affecting public health globally through the contamination of food, air and water. It is damaging the gene pool, and causing high rates of infant mortality, cancer, leukaemia, birth defects and immune system disorders.

"The non-proliferation Treaty. We view the negotiation of a CTBT as facilitating the discussion of the larger non-proliferation issue. Early negotiation of a CTBT will strengthen the prospects for a successful outcome of the non-proliferation Treaty review and extension conference in 1995. As preparations continue for this conference, we stress the urgent need to open genuine negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament, and address the discriminatory nature of some of the provisions of the Treaty.

"Fundamental to the NPT is the asymmetry between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. We therefore urge the

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Conference on Disarmament to adopt measures designed to address the security concerns of all nations. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will play a critical role in addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. We also call on the Conference to commence negotiations on an international convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons, as identified in General Assembly resolution 48/76 B as "a matter of priority". We additionally support further discussion and eventual negotiation on disarmament and development as addressed in General Assembly resolution 48/75 A. Finally, we are encouraged that the Conference will commence negotiation on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes.

"Arms manufacture and transfers. As stated in General Assembly resolution 48/75 B, "the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest stockpiles." Accordingly, we urge the nuclear-weapons States to accept their responsibility in halting the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear material and in dismantling existing arsenals. Recognizing the grave dangers conventional weapons pose as well, we support the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. We welcome the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in promoting openness and transparency and wish for broader participation in the years to come. To progress further, we ask that the question of ensuring reductions in international arms transfers and sales be included in the mandate of the Committee.

"NGO access to the Conference on Disarmament. As in previous years, we again urge the Conference to widen NGO access to its work. To achieve disarmament requires not only the political will of Governments but also understanding and support by the peoples. Wide dissemination of information and education at the popular level is an essential aspect of accomplishing these tasks. NGOs have worldwide constituencies and networks through which to inform, educate and build support for disarmament measures and treaties. They can also be a valuable channel for collecting information and making it available to the Conference. This would be greatly facilitated if NGOs had better access to the Conference. NGOs actively promoting disarmament would welcome opportunities for discussions with members of the Conference on Disarmament on this matter. In the same light, we welcome the decision to open the remaining two NPT Conference preparatory committee meetings to NGOs.

"In conclusion, we would like to again thank the Conference on Disarmament for hearing our concerns and for addressing the issues we have raised here today. We wish to express our continued support of your efforts to achieve a safer and more peaceful world.

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"This joint statement is submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of the following non-governmental organizations: International Peace Bureau, International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations, Lutheran World Federation, Women for Peace, Geneva, Women for Peace, France, Women's International Democratic Federation, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, World Federation of United Nations Associations and World Peace Council."

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for reading this message. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to thank the NGOs for their message and wish them continuing success in their worthwhile endeavours.

Before giving the floor to those speakers inscribed today, I should like to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage in connection with the message we have just heard. I give the floor to India as Coordinator of the Group of 21.

Mr. KUMAR (India): Mr. President, since this is the first time I am speaking in my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21 under your presidency, let me congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the CD. I extend our best wishes for all your endeavours.

I have taken the floor to express our appreciation and thank the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for their important statement - it is a healthy tradition. We feel that it is a useful contribution, since the Group of 21 believes in the importance of associating non-governmental organizations working for disarmament in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Coordinator of the Group of 21 for his statement. I now give the floor to Canada as Coordinator of the Western Group.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I have the honour to acknowledge and to welcome, on behalf of the Western Group in the Conference on Disarmament, the message from nine non-governmental organizations, and to thank them for the support they are giving to the Conference on Disarmament. The members of these organizations, both men and women, have demonstrated their fidelity to the high aims described in the statement, over many years.

Of particular importance is the constant support given to the Conference on Disarmament by the international women's community; and it is my particular honour to acknowledge and salute this constancy in the context of arrangements to mark International Women's Day on 8 March. During the most tense period of the cold war, we could count on not only their support, but their constant reminders that cooperation and dialogue are highly preferable to confrontation and mistrust. In this post-cold-war era, we share the hopes and fears expressed in the statement.

The Western Group is pleased to note the particular points made about the Conference on Disarmament's efforts in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban

treaty. The non-governmental organizations presenting this statement are undoubtedly aware that, on the issue of treaty verifications and compliance, their objectives and ours are very similar. We are grateful, however, for the recalling of the importance of some provision in the treaty to solve, through cooperative measures, differences which may arrive in ensuring treaty compliance. We will do well, in our efforts to agree on a settlement-of-disputes mechanism, to recall the spirit and the substance of these valuable suggestions. We will look forward to new ideas and contributions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Coordinator of the Western Group for his statement. I now give the floor to the Russian Federation as Coordinator of the East European Group.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I would like to take this opportunity to convey to the representatives of women's international organizations, as well as all our dear ladies participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, congratulations on the occasion of International Women's Day, which is extensively marked by celebrations in our country too. On behalf of the East European Group and on behalf of the Russian delegation, allow me to express our sincere gratitude for the message addressed to our forum. In it we see evidence of the determination of the better and, I must say, the larger half of humanity to fight for a better future for our planet, for a world without war or the nuclear threat. Our Conference on Disarmament - and I am sure all those participating in it will support me in this - will do everything to justify these hopes of yours.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Coordinator of the East European Group for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, first of all I would like to warmly congratulate you on behalf of the Chinese delegation on taking up the CD Presidency. I am confident that under your presidency the work of the CD will be crowned with success. I would like to take this opportunity also to express my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Errera of France, for his contributions.

Like other delegations the Chinese delegation welcomes among us the delegates of nine non-governmental and international women's organizations, including the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. We have listened to their message with attention. We certainly congratulate them on the effort they have made in promoting disarmament and peace and would also like to thank them for their support and understanding of the CD's work. The Chinese delegation once again warmly congratulates them on 8 March, International Women's Day. At the same time please also allow me to extend our festive greetings to women colleagues of all delegations and women staff in the Secretariat and all women present.

The message we have just heard contained a reference to the fourth World Conference on Women. In this connection the Chinese delegation is pleased to point out that in accordance with the resolution of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the fourth World Conference on Women will be held in September 1995 in Beijing, China's capital. This is a major event for all women in China and the world at large. At present the Chinese Government is working with many women's organizations in China in active preparations for this Conference so that we will be able to warmly welcome the representatives from Governments and non-governmental women's organizations. The expected number of participants will be about 30,000. The women and the people of China will do their very best to contribute to the success of that Conference.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, first I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to join previous speakers in warmly welcoming in our midst the 1994 women's gathering in connection with International Women's Day. We thank them for the important message just read out by Ms. Mackby. In the past few years substantial progress has been made in the field of disarmament. The START agreements foresee drastic reductions of existing nuclear arsenals, and negotiations have started in this Conference with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Steps are furthermore being taken towards the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is important that this process enjoys universal support. In this context, Governments as well as NGOs and private individuals play an important role. We therefore highly appreciate the message of the women's gathering. Over the years, many women have made significant contributions to the cause of peace and disarmament. In this context, I would like to recall the names of my compatriots, Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson. They both represent a deep commitment to global peace and disarmament, both in their capacity as official representatives of my country and as women. They indeed constitute a source of inspiration for all women who work for disarmament, peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: Before taking up the list of speakers I have mentioned, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Australia, Ambassador Richard Starr, who is with us for the first time today. I am sure I speak for all of us when I say that we look forward to working closely with him and wish him a fruitful and satisfying involvement in the Conference on Disarmament.

The first speaker on my list today is the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ho.

Mr. HO (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to extend my warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of this important conference. My delegation is confident that under your wise and experienced guidance productive results will be achieved. You can be assured that my delegation will provide you with its fullest support during your term as President of this body. On behalf of my delegation, I would also like to extend

my sincere appreciation to the preceding President, Ambassador Errera of France, for his leadership during the initial part of this year's session. As this is the first occasion that I am taking the floor at the current session, I would like to convey my hearty congratulations to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky on his assumption last December of the post of Secretary-General of the CD. I would also like to appreciate and welcome the message of the women's organizations.

I have requested the floor today to explain my Government's position on major issues before this multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Before proceeding further, I would like to comment briefly on the direction of Korea's efforts to cope with recent developments on a global and regional level.

Since the end of the cold war, new international security concerns have surfaced, characterized by regional conflicts, such as that in Bosnia and Somalia. There is also a growing danger stemming from the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and long-range missiles. These trends pose challenges to the preservation of peace and security. Against this backdrop, there cannot be a stable and enduring peace without international cooperative efforts to control the worldwide spread of arms. In order to do this, the international cooperative system must be further strengthened, particularly within the framework of the United Nations and other relevant international organs. This is why my Government, under the leadership of President Kim Young Sam, has undertaken a recent initiative to intensify Korea's efforts to become involved in the international process through greater participation in the process of multilateral exercises, including arms control and disarmament.

Given the growing worldwide threat of regional conflicts, we cannot but put more emphasis on the importance of regional disarmament and the arms control process. In this regard, the specific characteristics of each region should be taken into account as a main component in the discussion of regional disarmament and arms control efforts. Turning our attention to the regional situation in north-east Asia we have come to recognize the necessity of establishing an appropriate cooperative regional security system designed to prevent armed conflicts and secure peace and stability by increasing military predictability.

As an initial effort toward preserving regional peace and security, confidence-building measures (CBMs) should be worked out and implemented on a gradual and step-by-step basis between the States in the region. CBMs would lead to enhanced mutual understanding and trust, and reduce tension and distrust among the countries concerned. With respect to arms control on the Korean peninsula, the Government of the Republic of Korea has maintained a consistent position favouring the gradual implementation of CBMs. We have also been consistent in emphasizing diplomatic efforts to work out a solution to the recent nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula through dialogue among the parties directly concerned. My Government hopes that nuclear transparency on the Korean peninsula will be enhanced through the prompt implementation of a complete international inspection

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regime. This would contribute to peace and security in north-east Asia and throughout the world.

My delegation's foremost concern for this year is to strengthen further the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Due to the inhumane and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, my delegation is deeply concerned about any possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. We share with many other nations the strong hope that these heinous weapons will be eliminated. In an effort to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime, we are obliged to deal with the two following tasks in the context of multilateral disarmament: one is to extend the NPT in 1995, and the other is to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date.

The year 1995 will mark a watershed in international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons as it is in 1995 that a conference will be convened to decide whether the NPT shall remain in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. My Government has faithfully observed the provisions of the NPT since its accession to the Treaty in 1975. Regardless of its discriminatory nature, the Treaty has contributed to the prevention of both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, we hope that the NPT will be indefinitely extended in 1995, and that the NPT regime will be thoroughly reviewed and every effort will be made to improve the Treaty by strengthening the present nuclear safeguards system through reinforcement of its inspection regime. By doing so, the NPT would be assured of remaining a cornerstone for building a more peaceful and secure world. We should also seek to facilitate further the transfer of nuclear technology and information for peaceful purposes. My Government will continue to participate actively in the discussions of the preparatory committee for the 1995 NPT conference, and will focus its efforts on extending and strengthening the NPT regime.

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of an effective, verifiable and comprehensive multilateral test-ban treaty which will attract the adherence of all States, my delegation reaffirms its full support for multilateral efforts to conclude the CTBT, and at the same time extends its deep appreciation to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and its subsidiary bodies, for their continuing effort to conclude the CTBT. My Government has consistently encouraged international efforts for the early conclusion of the CTBT, with a firm belief that the early conclusion of the CTBT would be a positive step toward the 1995 extension of the NPT. My delegation expects that there will be substantial progress in the global effort to conclude the CTBT. For this purpose, all existing proposals for the draft CTBT should be taken into account, and efforts should be taken to facilitate the prompt achievement of a consensus centred on the rolling text. Our desire is to use the present momentum to establish an effective verification regime and a solid institutional foundation. It is also our hope that concrete progress will be made to conclude the CTBT before the 1995 NPT extension conference.

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In an effort to promote transparency in military matters, the United Nations General Assembly took an important step forward by adopting resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments, in accordance with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established on 1 January 1992. My delegation notes with great satisfaction that in 1992, 83 United Nations Member States submitted data on imports and exports of arms for the United Nations Register, and a significant portion of international arms transfers for the same year were covered. Given that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States, the Register is expected to be further developed into a universal and comprehensive confidence-building instrument for the promotion of transparency in military matters, thereby promoting genuine peace and security throughout the world.

My delegation firmly believes that further development of the Register can only be achieved with the widest possible participation of the Member States. In parallel, my delegation hopes that other related matters pertaining to resolution 46/36 L, such as definitions, inclusion of data on military holdings, and procurement through national production, will be duly addressed at this year's Conference. Inclusion of such matters would constitute a substantive change in the scope of the Register. In this connection, my delegation would like to draw attention to its annual White Paper on national defence, which my Government has issued since 1988. The White Paper deals in detail with its defence budget, procurement policies and defence capabilities, in both material and personnel terms.

The end of East-West confrontation and the resulting improvement in international relations form a sound basis for promoting further openness and transparency in all military matters. Multilateral disarmament negotiations must be a centrepiece in the maintenance of post-cold-war peace and security. The Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, is called upon to reflect the present post-cold-war atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation by restructuring itself, thereby securing universality for its own sake. In this regard, my delegation would like to extend once again its sincere appreciation to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan for his untiring efforts during the 1993 session to achieve both understanding and agreement on the issue of CD expansion. Simultaneously, we cannot but express deep regret with the fact that the CD has not yet been able to reach a consensus on its own expansion. My delegation is of the opinion that the issue of CD expansion should be resolved without further delay and without any counter-productive and undesirable linkage to other extraneous and unrelated matters. In this sense, my delegation strongly urges all member States of the CD to reconsider the CD's credibility and to adopt the O'Sullivan report on this issue by consensus. The principle of consensus should not be exploited as a means to address specific political concerns not directly related to the CD.

Before concluding my statement, I would like to reiterate my Government's support for the three key concepts: integration, globalization, and revitalization, which were enunciated by the Secretary-General of the

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United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 "New dimensions" report. My delegation believes that those three themes should lay the foundation for an intensified international effort to enhance the effectiveness of arms control and disarmament in the decades to come.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Skogmo, who will be addressing the Conference for the first time.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President in this important period of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has for the first time embarked on real negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is an issue of political importance to all States in this room, and indeed to global security in the longer term. As the sole international negotiating forum for disarmament the CD shoulders a heavy responsibility in getting these negotiations on track with a view to reaching an agreement as soon as possible. We believe it is essential that the negotiations proceed in earnest and without procedural delays. My delegation is convinced that the

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Conference will benefit from your wise and able leadership, Ambassador Hoffman, in facing up to the challenge. I offer the full support of my delegation in your endeavours.

As this is the first time I address the Conference, let me also offer the full support and cooperation of my delegation to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Under-Secretary-General, Vladimir Petrovsky, to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Bensmail, and to the rest of the secretariat of the Conference. I would also like to associate my delegation with the expressions of welcome to the efforts made over many years by women, individually and through NGOs, for the cause of disarmament.

This is the first time my delegation addresses the Conference since the start of the CTBT negotiations. I would like to offer a few preliminary views on some of the issues facing us. First of all, we recognize that there are interactions between progress towards a global ban on nuclear test explosions, and the possibilities for maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons. We believe it in our own and in the best interests of all countries to adhere to a non-proliferation regime, since a further spread of nuclear weapons can only diminish regional and global security. This aim is best secured by international legal instruments. We are pleased that negotiations on a CTBT are now proceeding in parallel with the preparations for the NPT review and extension conference. Substantial results on the CTBT by the end of 1994 will contribute significantly to a successful outcome of the 1995 conference. On the other hand, lack of substantial progress on the CTBT could indeed put the NPT conference in serious jeopardy. Secondly, national moratoria on nuclear testing have produced an auspicious political atmosphere for the negotiations. Such moratoria are also conducive to the preservation of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, there is increasing political concern in many countries, including my own, for the environmental impact of nuclear testing. The Norwegian Government urges the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further nuclear tests.

A CTBT should indeed be global, banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. The definition given in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 provides a good basis for the CTBT scope definition. Peaceful nuclear explosions will have to be included, as they have been in the Swedish draft treaty proposal. We believe this draft is a must useful starting-point for the negotiations. A CTBT verification regime should be sufficiently strong and effective to ensure that any potential violator stands a severe risk of being detected. A 100 per cent control system is probably not achievable, or affordable. A global seismic network would form the basis for the verification system, supplemented by other techniques that might be deemed useful and fall within acceptable cost parameters. We look forward to the third global seismic test (GSETT-3) that is now being prepared by the Group of Seismic Experts. It is of particular importance that commitments are now given from the States possessing alpha stations to take part in the experiment. Norway stands ready to take an active part in this crucial test. Within available resources we are prepared to provide technical assistance to

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countries who might need such assistance to take part in GSETT-3. For monitoring of a CTBT we would at present envisage a small, dedicated monitoring agency, drawing on available international expertise as necessary.

Over the last week we have witnessed a most useful presentation of non-seismic verification techniques within the verification Work Group. Some of these seem to offer useful supplementary methods of providing global coverage in all environments for the supervision of a CTBT. During the last session Norway submitted a working paper on non-seismic methods, particularly devoted to hydroacoustics. I hope it will be possible to engage our experts in the sessions devoted to these methods during the month of May. As negotiations progress in the Conference, my delegation will seek to make its contribution also in other fields.

We should not expect the CTBT to be a perfect agreement from all perspectives. It will be a compromise between differing interests and concerns. The perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good. Otherwise, we will not achieve a treaty in a time-frame when it is still politically relevant.

I have emphasized the efforts of the Conference in one area. Let me note that Norway is pleased that the Conference on Disarmament has found it possible to devote attention also to the important issues of negative security assurances, to transparency in armaments, and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, having established respective committees for these subjects. In addition we fully support the important task given to Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Coordinator for the issue of cut-off in the production of fissile material.

It will not be news to anyone here that Norway takes an active interest in becoming a member of the Conference on Disarmament. Our application was submitted no less than 14 years ago. Our joy was understandably great - also at the highest political level in Oslo - when Ambassador O'Sullivan presented his list of new members in August of last year. This was the second time Norway appeared on the short-list for an expansion of the Conference. But great was also our disappointment when again it appeared that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to bring about the expansion. Our hopes for a solution have been rekindled and extinguished several times in the intervening period, with the various solutions that were ardently pursued by Ambassadors Zahran and Errera. So far the CD seems only able to agree to disagree. The expansion issue in our view needs a rapid solution, inter alia, to provide a broader basis for the CTBT negotiations. The most reasonable and feasible way forward would seem to be the adoption by the CD of Ambassador O'Sullivan's proposal, if necessary on the basis of the more recent proposal by Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico. We urge the Conference to continue to give the issue of expansion high priority. I take this opportunity to reiterate that my country would be ready to take her seat as a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first and foremost allow me to congratulate you on performing the functions of President of this Conference and assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation. We have asked for the floor to present the views of the Argentine delegation on some of the main items on our agenda.

My country is committed to the results of the negotiations for the realization of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Consequently, above and beyond the position we have set out in the Ad Hoc Committee, we would like to comment in greater detail here on some of the aspects of that position and explain others. One of these is the concept of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In this connection, and in view of the fact that a country that is a member of this Conference has expressed some doubts about the content of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and about this type of explosion, I would like to provide clarification on this point. Tlatelolco allows, under certain conditions, something that the NPT prohibits: the possibility of carrying out what are called peaceful nuclear explosions. Despite this, no such explosions have ever been carried out in the region, nor is the possibility that any member country of the Treaty will carry one out being envisaged. Indeed, the interpretation of the member States, as reflected in various OPANAL documents, is that the carrying out of such explosions could be permitted only if the technology necessary was different from that used in the production of nuclear weapons. Obviously this is not the case. Likewise, under the Treaty all the States parties must sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In practice this is the same type of agreement signed by the countries belonging to the NPT, prohibiting the explosive use of nuclear energy. Indeed, we cannot fail to point out that the two countries of the region which might perhaps have been best placed to carry out this type of test, Argentina and Brazil, have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA, by virtue of which they undertook to apply safeguards to all nuclear material as well as to all activities of the same type carried out on their territory or in any place under their jurisdiction or control, for the sole purpose of verifying that such material was not diverted for nuclear weapons or for "any other nuclear explosive device".

In addition to this, Argentina and Brazil included in article I, paragraph 3 of the bilateral agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, signed in Guadalajara, Mexico on 18 June 1991 and ratified by the Parliaments of both countries, the following clause:

> "Bearing in mind that at present no technical distinction can be made between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes, the Parties also undertake to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories, and to abstain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or from participating in any way in, the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear explosive device while the above-mentioned technical limitation exists."

On the basis of this Latin American consensus on the matter, and considering that any nuclear explosion in itself produces benefits in the military sphere, our position is clearly in favour of ensuring that the treaty that we are negotiating here prohibits explosions of all types at all times in all places. We also believe that the treaty should clearly stipulate a comprehensive ban and should not be subject to any threshold. However, with regard to what are called "preparatory activities", we believe that the extension of the ban to the various stages of these could affect activities that are not actually being carried out for testing purposes. Indeed, we fear that they might complicate the verification regime of the treaty. However, the subject deserves greater analysis and we are prepared to consider the various points of view on this matter.

The credibility of the nuclear-test-ban treaty will to a very great extent depend on the verification regime. Therefore, an effective verification regime should have an efficient monitoring capability composed of various elements - seismic, hydroacoustic, atmospheric sampling of radionuclides and waste gases - as well as provisions for on-site inspection. The exchange of information among States parties could also help identify any violations. On-site inspections should be a special and decisive deterrent element, and therefore the treaty should contain effective and efficient procedures for controlled inspection. The verification regime will have to rely on information from all possible sources, either supplied by international organizations or by States parties. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction at the very good work being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts under the leadership of Dr. Dahlman and in response to the request he made during the last plenary meeting of the Conference, I have pleasure in announcing my country's undertaking that all our seismological stations will participate for the attainment of the objectives and the success of Group of Seismic Experts' Technical Test No. 3 (GSETT-3). We will also contribute to the work of this Group through the participation of an expert starting with the meetings that will take place during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament.

As far as institutions are concerned, it is very clear for us that a small international organization should be set up for the application of the treaty, especially its verification and compliance regimes. This body should be able to handle the exchange of important information concerning monitoring and constitute a forum for the rapid review of requests for on-site inspections, as well as for the discussion and joint treatment of any questions relating to compliance with its provisions submitted by States parties to the treaty. Obviously the treaty will have to have a sanctions regime that will include strong collective action in the event of violation of its provisions, including, in the final analysis, resort to the United Nations Security Council. In this connection we believe that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could usefully serve as a model for devising an appropriate sanctions regime. Yet above and beyond any consensus that we might reach on all these aspects, the success of the NTB Treaty will only be possible if it enjoys the participation of the five nuclear-

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weapon States and broad international support, the only means of attaining the desired goal of non-proliferation.

Transparency in armaments is a subject of special importance for the Argentine Republic. Last year, the Conference established for the first time an Ad Hoc Committee on this item. Various specific proposals were tabled, intensive discussions were held on these, especially on questions referring to military holdings and procurement through national production. There were approximately 15 working papers on the table, some of them containing proposals on practical, universal and non-discriminatory means to increase transparency and openness. Moreover, the participation of more than 80 countries in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is in our view a very good start. Nevertheless, much still remains to be done in order to bring about universal participation and the availability of information that will give us a realistic and far-reaching view of the international situation in this matter and its evolution.

We share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General, set out in his 1992 report on disarmament, that transparency is no substitute for reductions in arms, but that when properly applied, it can be conductive to confidence-building among States and helpful in alerting the global community to excessive accumulations of armaments. Thus, it could serve as another useful tool in facilitating non-proliferation efforts.

Therefore, we resolutely support the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as well as the work of the Group of Governmental Experts established to devise techniques and procedures for the Register and study arrangements for its future expansion. Moreover, we share the view that openness and transparency are important as part of the process of strengthening confidence and that they should be emphasized at the regional and subregional levels. In this connection, the regional seminars sponsored by the United Nations have already proved useful. This was the case for the regional seminar on the Register for the transfer of conventional arms on the American continent which was organized by my country under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Disarmament in 1993.

Another demonstration of Argentina's interest in these activities at the regional level is the forthcoming holding in Buenos Aires between 15 and 18 March of a meeting of experts on measures for strengthening mutual trust and security mechanisms in the region, a meeting sponsored by the Organization of American States, whose central aim is to promote better dialogue on security and cooperation matters among the nations of our hemisphere. We regret that the Director of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs has announced that for budgetary reasons the Centre will not be present at this important regional event. In November 1993 a preparatory meeting for the expert meeting to be held in Buenos Aires was held at OAS headquarters in Washington. At that time representatives of various member countries described the different activities under way in the region on confidence-building measures. We would like to refer to one or two of them. Argentina and Brazil made presentations on

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bilateral agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Colombia and Venezuela on confidence-building measures between the two countries; Honduras, representing Central America, on the new treaty on Central American security; the Caribbean countries on security problems in a region with no armed forces. In addition, Argentina referred to the confidence-building measures agreed with the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic region.

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Despite the fact that in 1993 very interesting discussions were held in this Conference, we have to be realistic and acknowledge that we only scratched the surface of the subject of transparency in armaments, exchanging views on a number of important questions but without taking any specific step with regard to them. We suggest that the Ad Hoc Committee should take up the subject where it left off last September, focusing its attention principally on matters relating to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

We also think that the Conference should transmit to the Group of Experts its views on these matters and on the Register of Conventional Arms. The appropriate way of doing this would be at the end of May so that the Group of Experts could take the views of the Conference on Disarmament into consideration before concluding its work. This contribution would be in complete consonance with the mandate of the Conference. In order to facilitate our discussions we think it will be appropriate to give careful consideration to the specific documents submitted last year that refer to transparency and openness in the conventional field, the size and organization of armed forces, the declaration of closure and conversion of military facilities and regional transparency - this last a matter on which my country has taken more than one practical and concrete initiative.

My delegation put before the Conference for its consideration in 1993 a document (CD/TIA/WP.14) concerning weapons of mass destruction as another area that should be studied and considered by the Conference with a view to elaborating practical means aimed at enhancing transparency, in accordance with the existing legal instruments. Argentina believes that the overall process of transparency should be gradual and balanced, in order to ensure its universality and successful implementation. This requires that weapons of mass destruction should also be addressed as an integral part of a more general process that covers other segments spelled out in resolution 46/36, such as conventional arms, equipment, holdings, personnel and information on the transfer of high technology with military applications.

We think that it is a challenge for the Conference on Disarmament to devote itself to these initiatives regarding transparency in armaments and we share the views already expressed by other delegations to the effect that this transparency is the vehicle that leads to the development of measures to build up confidence and to share information, efforts that are not costly, do not require verification regimes and are not reflected in the structure of a "cut-off" treaty.

Finally, we think that nuclear non-proliferation would also benefit considerably from a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We favour the timely negotiation of an overall agreement to prohibit the continued production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or those that are not subject to international safeguards. This agreement should be

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formally negotiated within this Conference on Disarmament. This could place the nuclear programmes of certain countries that are not

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covered by international safeguards under certain containment measures, and at the same time would curb the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in the five nuclear Powers.

The challenges facing the Conference are enormous, but we believe we are engaged in this fruitful exercise to respond to the hopes of the international community for greater stability, transparency and security.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you well and assure you of my full cooperation. On the same occasion I would like to pay tribute to your predecessor Ambassador Errera of France. I am confident that with your efficiency and humour the Conference on Disarmament is indeed in good hands. I also wish to seize this opportunity to welcome among us Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia, with whom I look forward to cooperating; I wish him a successful mission. My delegation has always maintained close ties with the dynamic Australian delegation, not only in the CD but also in all other forums. I also wish to welcome in our midst Ambassador Bjørn Skogmo of Norway. I look forward to cooperating with him and his delegation and I wish his country, Norway, together with other countries non-members of the CD, an early solution to the expansion issue. I refer to his statement and the statement of Ambassador Ho of the Republic of Korea. I wish to see them both in the near future as fully-fledged members of the CD as well as all other applicants.

I would not want to miss this opportunity to fully support the words of appreciation directed by the G.21 Coordinator, the representative of India, to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. On behalf of nine NGOs, whose statement was read by Ms. Mackby, I would like to congratulate the League and all women on this occasion of commemorating International Women's Day. The views expressed by the nine NGOs on the issues inscribed on the CD agenda are most useful in the framework of the disarmament deliberations in general, and the work of the CD in particular. My delegation looks forward to direct NGO participation in the CD, as is the case in virtually all other forums, whether within or outside the United Nations system. The knowledge, views and experience of NGOs which are active in the field of disarmament can only enrich the work of the CD as the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

The issue of transparency in armaments is a subject which has now made its appearance on the CD agenda for the third consecutive year. While I believe it is fair to state that we all support and firmly believe in the ultimate objectives of transparency in armaments, namely to increase confidence, strengthen security and enhance stability at both the regional and international levels, I also believe that it is clear that we do not all agree about how we should proceed towards these objectives.

Following the adoption of resolution 46/36 L at the General Assembly, Egypt was one of the countries which supported a swift response by the Conference on Disarmament to the request made to it in paragraphs 12 to 15

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of resolution 46/36 L. I even had the privilege and honour of serving as the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of transparency in armaments and later on as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. My delegation's swift response to the request of the General Assembly, and our willingness to accept the addition of a new item on our CD agenda, can only be seen as a gesture of good will, particularly given the fact that too many other items on our agenda, and especially the nuclear items, have been neglected or consciously left dormant for much too long.

Today, I cannot hide my country's surprise at the way an issue as promising as that of transparency in armaments, and I underline that by armaments we mean all armaments, is being treated in a fashion that aims at widening even further the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Thus, while for the time being we are all required to disclose information on the same categories of arms, the information provided by some speaks volumes about their military capabilities while the same information provided by others, even though we do not doubt its accuracy, hardly scratches the surface of their military potential. Thus, the vital security interests of the latter are kept intact while those of the former are largely exposed, which in effect means that the same transparency measures applied in different contexts can have very different effects, both on the positive and negative sides of the scale.

The Egyptian delegation is perplexed by the fact that statements made this year and working papers circulated on the issue of transparency in armaments were designed to perpetrate the idea that the exercise of transparency should be limited to conventional arms and then only to certain types of conventional arms. We have repeatedly stated, and continue to do so, that if it is to be an effective confidence-building measure, and act as an early warning mechanism in case of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, transparency in armaments must apply to all armaments including weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, high technology with military applications and all types of conventional weapons.

Given the fact that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments derived from resolution 46/36 L provides for our work to conclude at the end of 1994, we must therefore ensure that we avoid spending our limited time on issues which fall outside the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and which the General Assembly has not requested the Conference on Disarmament to examine such as military forces, budgets, etc. At least we should concentrate instead on all the questions we are explicitly asked to examine.

With respect to weapons of mass destruction and transfers of high technology with military applications, we are conscious of the fact that there exists a network of international agreements covering weapons of mass destruction. I do not wish here to outline the loopholes of this network, and particularly the fact that it cannot yet claim to be universal and that a number of States from all camps have, at best, ignored their commitments or even violated them. It is therefore evident that pending universal adherence to, and full implementation

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of, all legal instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, such weapons must be subjected to the transparency exercise. The inventory of these arms, which are considered to be both excessive and destabilizing by their very nature, should include, inter alia, stocks and production capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. This is also a confidence-building measure. If weapons of mass destruction are not reported to the Register, we would have deliberately omitted an extremely important factor which determines how far the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms at the disposal of such or such a country can threaten international peace and security. Thus the international community cannot get an early warning in the case of an aggression or threat of aggression.

We also heard, on numerous occasions, that a great deal of information was already publicly available on weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons. While these arguments may be partially true, it applies to an even larger extent to conventional arms, including the seven categories of the Register, and it is hence only logical that having gone through the trouble of setting up a Register of Conventional Arms, this same Register should expand to cover weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to transfers of high technology with military applications, we are of the view that such transfers need also to be reported, since access by some to advanced technology can have a destabilizing and aggravating effect, particularly in those areas of the world with regional conflicts. Accurate and effective reporting of transfers of high technology with military applications would enhance transparency and might even become an adequate substitute for certain export control measures which can be applied selectively by allowing certain States to benefit from advanced technologies while denying others the same privilege.

In the statements we made before the Ad Hoc Committee last year we repeatedly stressed the importance of agreeing on the definitions of the terms we most commonly use in our daily work. We continue to hold this view, and we believe that no concrete measure to enhance transparency can be a good and practicable one unless there is an agreed common denominator and common definition of terms used therein. My delegation was gratified to note the United States views as expressed in TIA working paper 19 that the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts in New York should work towards a universal definition of "transfers". In our view, the same holds true here at the CD for terms such as "military holdings", "procurement through national production", "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms", etc. In this context, let me state that my delegation is not comfortable with the definitions proposed so far for certain terms, and in particular "military holdings" and "procurement through national production". First and foremost, we firmly believe that our work must have a much wider scope than the very limited one of the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Given the fact that a primary objective of the transparency exercise is to provide the international community with an early warning system aimed at detecting excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, it is only logical that all categories and types of arms,

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including advanced conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, should form an intrinsic part of our common understanding or definitions, and we cannot see on what grounds any arms would be excluded or disassociated from an agreed definition. We also believe that the physical location of arms should not be a ground for exclusion. Thus, arms located within or outside national territory or territorial waters must also be subjected to reporting and transparency measures. The same holds true for all arms maintained in stocks or in storage, arms leased or lent or in any other way placed at the disposal of a foreign country, arms undergoing research, development, testing or evaluation, etc. It is also the view of the Egyptian delegation that we must avoid the proliferation of a multitude of instruments covering various aspects of the transparency question. Such a multi-dimensional approach would only make reporting requirements more complex and might, rather than promote transparency, blur the general picture. It is therefore necessary for us to focus our work on the expansion of the United Nations Register rather than the development of new mechanisms.

Finally, I wish to seize this opportunity to recall that Egypt has reservations with regard to the shortcomings of the Register in its present form. These reservations are reflected in our submission to the United Nations Register in 1993. We therefore can only urge all those who have, prior to the adoption of resolution 46/36 L, given clear undertakings with regard to the revision and expansion of the Register, to fulfil these commitments. The lack of substantive progress in this regard would undoubtedly overshadow the commitment of various countries with regard to future reporting.

I wish lastly to state that my delegation is participating actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. We will also be looking very closely at the willingness of all delegations to address seriously the very legitimate concerns and preoccupations of a large number of CD members and non-members and a much larger number of States throughout the community of nations. Our observations here at the CD and the assessment of our work carried out in other forums will be the determining factors likely to influence our position on any future TIA resolution at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Lampreia.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil): Mr. President, let me begin by expressing my delegation's satisfaction at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your diplomatic skills, which have already been proven, and experience constitute an important asset to this crucial stage of our deliberations. You can be assured that we shall cooperate in every way towards the satisfactory outcome of our work. Let me also express our gratitude to Ambassador Gérard Errera, your predecessor, for the able and energetic manner in which he conducted our business during his tenure as President of the CD.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Several speakers have highlighted the relevance of this year's work, particularly on account of the negotiation of a CTBT. My delegation has no doubt that it constitutes the most important issue before us and we are confident in the CD's capacity to meet the international community's expectations in this regard. We are encouraged by the work already done and are grateful to the delegations of Sweden and Australia for the papers they

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have provided. Let me also put on record our special thanks to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, who has recently left us and who has made such a direct and personal contribution to our present undertaking.

As many others here represented, my Government has been a long-standing supporter of a CTBT. We have always maintained that there is an indissoluble link between disarmament and non-proliferation. The CTBT represents the instrumentation of such a concept, inasmuch as it affects both dimensions of this same question. It must be recalled that the traditional purpose of a CTBT has been to put a curb to the nuclear arms race, as an important step towards complete nuclear disarmament, as has already been spelled out in even broader terms in the partial test-ban treaty. There have been significant and positive changes in the international scenario since these matters were first discussed. They have not, however, altered the need to pursue that goal or diminished the relevance of a CTBT for its achievement.

Some delegations consider the future CTBT as an additional instrument to avoid horizontal non-proliferation. We welcome the further assurances that the Treaty shall bring in this regard. We consider, however, that a CTBT, to be effective, must have an impact on vertical proliferation. The CTBT has to have a direct bearing on horizontal proliferation or it will not fulfil one of its objectives, but it also has to have a direct bearing on the nuclear arms race and the ability to improve and update nuclear weapons or it will not fulfil its other objective. We have to work within these boundaries, and we have already given this Committee a clear mandate in this direction. Furthermore, from Tlatelolco to IAEA safeguards, there already exists a number of relevant multilateral instruments and mechanisms aimed at impeding horizontal proliferation. The CTBT is not an isolated instrument, but one that must be elaborated in light of existing agreements in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament and international security. What we now require is a treaty of a different nature. One that takes a broader step, long overdue, to curb vertical proliferation.

As you know, Brazil is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty, not on account of its non-proliferation commitments, which we entirely share, but because we have perceived always inherent inequities in that instrument. Our commitment to non-proliferation has been reinforced since 1990, through a series of joint initiatives we undertook with Argentina, of which you are all well aware. Central among these is the safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is a full-scope safeguards agreement, as is well known, providing the same assurances on horizontal proliferation as those required by the NPT. I am very glad to say that the Brazilian Congress has recently approved this agreement last month and that my Government promulgated it on 24 February.

We wish to express our appreciation to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, under whose competent guidance we were able to reach agreement on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee. The mandate calls for "a universal and multilaterally and

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effectively verifiable" treaty. Universality requires that the treaty be open to the signature of all States and that we engage our best efforts to assure their adherence. To fulfil this determination it is my Government's belief that the treaty has to be non-discriminatory, meaning that it should stipulate equal rights and equal obligations. This condition is specifically relevant to the basic undertakings, the verification regime and the mechanisms for the application of sanctions that are to be established.

For Brazil, the central achievement of a CTBT is to enshrine in an international document the commitment of States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to engage no more in nuclear testing. We engage in these negotiations with a very open mind and are ready to give serious consideration to all earnest proposals, as long as they fall in line with our basic requirement of a universal and non-discriminatory treaty. We are therefore flexible, which is not to say that we do not have our ideas related to the treaty. I would like to share with you some of our thoughts.

The first basic issue to be addressed is the scope of the undertaking. Ideally, we would like to see a treaty that bans all nuclear experiments aimed at the development, maintenance or improvement of nuclear weapons. We acknowledge that this is a very broad commitment, but we also consider it to be the one that fully reflects the long-standing aspirations of the international community and that adequately covers the two objectives we have identified. On the other hand we have also to acknowledge the political, technical and financial limitations we face. Therefore, without losing sight of our ultimate objectives, we are prepared to accept a more limited scope.

We accept that the CTBT is not to be a treaty banning nuclear weapons, but neither is it to be one in which we construe an explicit or implicit legitimation of those weapons, for this would be in direct opposition to its traditional objective. We wish to avoid a debate on these issues as we believe it would be repetitive and fruitless. We believe it can be done without detriment to the consistency and effectiveness of our work. In order to do so, we must concentrate on what we increasingly perceive as our common objective, namely the prohibition of all types of nuclear explosive tests in all environments for an unlimited period of time.

We are ready to accept the proscription of peaceful nuclear explosions. This is, however, a delicate question and requires careful attention. We acknowledge that there are presently no distinctions between explosive devices for peaceful purposes and others. We also acknowledge that peaceful nuclear explosions can serve for the development of nuclear weapons or for their improvement. That is why in our view they must be prohibited. But we must not impose limitations on potentially important scientific and technological developments. We have no precise proposals in this regard, but we perceive this concern to be shared by other delegations and we are convinced we can find an appropriate way of incorporating it into the treaty.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

We do not favour the inclusion of a broad and all-encompassing proscription of preparation in the undertaking. Several delegations have pointed out the problems this might engender. The first one relates to the difficulty if not impossibility of distinguishing preparation of licit activities from that of proscribed ones. The second relates to the

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verification requirements it would impose. Our concerns do not mean that we rule out any aspect of preparations, such as the monitoring of nuclear test sites.

In order to provide States members with the confidence required by the relevance of their commitments, the CTBT must have an effective verification regime. We must not, however, be over-ambitious in this task and set verification standards that become impossible to achieve. The CTBT is of course a political instrument. Its essential value lies in the commitment of States parties. We all aspire to an effective verification regime, but we cannot hold the scope and the commitments we are going to undertake hostage to excessive verification demands. When elaborating the verification system it is very important to take into account that the CTBT is not an isolated instrument, but that it will integrate a number of other instruments, mechanisms and regimes to which it bears close relation. We cannot conceive the CTBT's verification system as being unrelated and completely independent from IAEA safeguards and the future verification of a cut-off agreement. The verification of a CTBT does not necessarily require the accounting of nuclear material. But the accounting of nuclear material can indicate that member States are not diverting it for nuclear explosive purposes, thus providing the assurances required by a CTBT. If we take this into account, we can reduce the costs of the future verification regime and strengthen its effectiveness. IAEA safeguards require more than US$ 70 million annually. We do not believe we are in a position to overlook these figures and not to avail ourselves of the potential savings we may be able to achieve. Furthermore, we do not believe it wise to set up completely independent verification regimes for treaties or agreements that are essentially related to each other. This will again be very much the case if we can conclude an agreement on the cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear explosive purposes.

There is in our view a growing consensus on the understanding that seismic verification will constitute the basis of the additional verification required for underground testing. The Group of Scientific Experts has been examining this question for many years and its findings represent a valuable contribution to our work. My Government has recently committed itself to participation in such a Group. In order to reduce costs, national capacitation in this area has to be fully taken into account. This is, however, a delicate question that requires further consideration, for the multilateral verification regime must rely on unbiased and independent data.

With the possible exception of the accountability of all nuclear material, no single verification procedure or technique can effectively cover the full spectrum of potential nuclear explosions. That is the case with seismic verification. The CD has been examining a number of complementary techniques, directed mainly at environments other than underground. We hold this to be an important exercise, but we caution against speculation with unproven methods and undertaking over-ambitious proposals. On-site inspections may also come to play a very important role, even if only to be used on rare occasions. On account of the complex technical and operational problems involved, as well as the political

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questions raised, we strongly favour the evolutionary approach proposed by the delegation of Australia for the verification regime.

We have not discussed in detail the question of the organization that the treaty will require. We share the view that this question can only be adequately assessed once we have more clearly defined other issues such as scope and verification. My delegation does not believe that we are yet at a stage where we can determine whether the CTBT will require the establishment of new intergovernmental decision-making bodies. In order to carry out its verification responsibilities, however, it will certainly require a technical secretariat, which may be entirely new or set up within IAEA.

There have been a number of suggestions related to the organization. Some have mentioned the need for a new multilateral agency, with two deliberative intergovernmental instances and a technical secretariat. The first intergovernmental body would be open to all member States, the second, more restricted, would take the form of an executive council. The Australian proposal is the creation of a small CTBT organization co-located in Vienna with IAEA, in order to make the best use of its capacitation. The Swedish proposal is to entrust the verification of the CTBT to IAEA and to its Board of Governors the responsibility of decisions related to compliance and the need for additional verification such as on-site inspections. We find merits in both the Australian and the Swedish proposals.

The entry into force of the treaty should not be overcomplicated. This is a delicate question related to security concerns of all States. The ratification of the CTBT by all States having significant nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power stations and research reactors, has been suggested as a requirement for the entry into force of the treaty. The longer the list of required ratifications, the more probability of any single delegation impeding the entry into force of the agreement. That is not what we want. Again, in this instance we believe it is important to recall that the CTBT is not an isolated instrument. We therefore believe that when considering the conditions that might be required for the entry into force of the treaty, we should take into account what other binding multilateral commitments of relevance to the commitments of the CTBT States have already undertaken. This would facilitate the entry into force, without affecting legitimate security concerns of member States.

The rapid and significant developments of the international scene in recent years have allowed for the present propitious political climate for the negotiation of a CTBT. Let us make the best use of these circumstances and not lose the sense of urgency and responsibility required to achieve this long-standing objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic Peoples's Republic of Korea.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, it is my delegation's great pleasure to join others in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this month.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

A few weeks ago, I informed the Conference of the problems which we faced in our efforts to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. I would like to take this opportunity to briefly inform the Conference again about the latest development on the issue.

As already made public, four immediate steps of simultaneous action for a package solution of the nuclear issue were adopted at the New York contact between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States on 25 February. These steps cover the questions of discontinuing joint military exercises, resuming inter-Korean working-level contact for the exchange of special envoys and starting inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the continuity of safeguards, and the question of holding the third round of DPRK-United States of America talks in Geneva from 21 March.

Most of the agreed steps have already entered into a stage of practical implementation. Thus, new prospects have opened for bringing back to its original track the process of a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue which had been temporarily derailed. It is lucky, indeed, that although it seems belatedly, both sides confirmed again in the agreement their stand to seek a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue on the principles of the DPRK-United States of America joint statement announced in June last year and decided upon concrete steps and timetable of action.

The agreement on the steps of simultaneous action, however, has not been reached through a smooth process. In the past, we have advanced reasonable proposals for a solution of the nuclear problem and made all sincere efforts to carry them into effect and shown a flexibility. Since the second round of DPRK-United States of America talks we have fulfilled the obligations we assumed voluntarily, as far as we could, for the negotiation with IAEA and North-South dialogue. It is well worth noting that, with a view to removing obstacles in the way of the talks, we put forward a new proposal that the nuclear issue should be solved completely in a way of package deal based on the principle of simultaneous action by both sides.

If a solution of the nuclear issue had been promoted as proposed by us from the very outset, it would not have undergone such serious twists and turns in its course, and it would not have taken such a long time to reach a basic agreement on the steps of simultaneous action. In fact, when we take into consideration the fact that half-a-century-long history of confrontation and distrust has lasted between the DPRK and the United States, it is self-evident that either of them is not in a position to urge the other to show confidence first. That is why we have held that if both sides wanted to find a reasonable solution to the problem on an equal and fair basis, they should not urge the other to move first but act simultaneously, and so, have repeatedly urged them to respond to simultaneous action in this direction.

The agreed conclusions on the steps of simultaneous action this time has created a favourable condition for the third round of talks and a package

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solution of the nuclear issue. The DPRK and the United States, according to the formula of package deal agreed upon between them, must now take steps for a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue such as the termination of the United States nuclear threat and hostile policy against the DPRK, the introduction of light-water reactors, the improvement of bilateral relations, the resumption of IAEA's routine and ad hoc inspections of the DPRK's nuclear facilities, and put them into effect.

The package deal based on simultaneous action is the only practical and reasonable way for both sides to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue on a completely equal footing, not through confrontation. This has been clearly proved by the whole course of the DPRK-United States talks, especially by the latest contact in which two sides agreed on simultaneous action.

If the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is resolved in a package deal, it would be decisively conducive to ensuring peace and security in the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. It is only too clear that, no matter what reasonable solution may be adopted, if a party obliged to implement it has no willingness to solve the issue, it is impossible to expect any substantial results. Though just a few days have passed since the publication of the conclusions on simultaneous action, ill-boding moves have been reported one after another, giving rise to doubt about the willingness of the other negotiating party to implement the conclusions. They made an official announcement that the exchange of special convoys between the North and South Korea and IAEA's inspection are preconditions for the suspension of the "Team Spirit 94" joint military exercises and the opening of the third-round talks between the two sides. These are acts to endanger the implementation of the agreement, which can never be justified.

As is well known, both sides set no precondition in agreeing on the steps for simultaneous action in New York. We take a serious view on such preconditions put forward by the other party, because it will obviously result in reversing again the agreement. As prescribed in the agreed conclusions, unless all the steps of simultaneous action are implemented fully, all the agreed points will automatically go amiss.

My Government will honestly implement the steps for simultaneous action agreed on recently and make every possible effort to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in a package deal. Our Government's official position was published by the head of the DPRK delegation to the DPRK-United States of America talks. The statement was circulated to delegations of the Conference by my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. HO (Republic of Korea): I wonder whether this is the proper forum to discuss the bilateral issues among us. However, since my colleague from North

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Korea mentioned something that inevitably affects the situation in my country, I think it is my duty to mention just a couple of points.

First of all, I regret that certain texts are distorted in his statement, mainly the conditions of proceeding with nuclear inspections and the United States-North Korea (otherwise known as DPRK) third round of talks. I must inform this Conference that the exchange of special convoys between South and North Korea and a full-list inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the North Korean nuclear facilities are the preconditions for proceeding in these matters.

The second point is that I wish to know whether this is the proper forum for discussing these bilateral issues; I humbly ask, Mr. President, that you may be able to make a ruling on this.

Mrs. CARVALHO DE PLASA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): First of all allow me to express our warmest congratulations to you on taking up the post of President of the Conference. We have every confidence in you and you may be sure you may count on the full cooperation of our delegation. We have asked for the floor to place on record our surprise at the way in which you conducted the part of our meeting which was devoted to the commemoration of International Women's Day. In these times it was unusual.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for your kind words, and allow me to be surprised at your surprise. I am not really aware of any wrong-doings. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case.

I wish to remind you that at our last plenary meeting, on 3 March, it was agreed that I would put to you for approval the recommendation contained in the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/1245, para. 14) concerning the proposed dates for the holding of the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group, i.e. 21-25 March 1994. May I take it that these dates are acceptable to the members of the Conference? This seems to be the case.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Ho, Republic of Korea)

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 17 March 1994, not at 10 o'clock but at 9.30 a.m. - so this is the first change in the flexibility we give to our timetable. The reason for this is that myself as well as my predecessor and my successor have an appointment with the Swiss authorities at 10.30 a.m. so therefore I would like to open this meeting here at 9.30 a.m. So, please note this in your calendars: 9.30 a.m. next Thursday.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.